X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment by Alserda, Gosse A.G. et al.
VU Research Portal
X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment




DOI (link to publisher)
10.1080/00036846.2018.1486011
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Alserda, G. A. G., Bikker, J. A., & Van Der Lecq, F. S. G. (2018). X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension
fund administration and investment. Applied Economics, 50(48), 5164-5188.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2018.1486011
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=raec20
Applied Economics
ISSN: 0003-6846 (Print) 1466-4283 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20
X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension
fund administration and investment
Gosse A.G. Alserda, Jacob A. Bikker & Fieke S.G. Van Der Lecq
To cite this article: Gosse A.G. Alserda, Jacob A. Bikker & Fieke S.G. Van Der Lecq (2018)
X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment, Applied
Economics, 50:48, 5164-5188, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1486011
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2018.1486011
Published online: 12 Jul 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 206
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment
Gosse A.G. Alserdaa,b, Jacob A. Bikkerb,c and Fieke S.G. Van Der Lecqd
aErasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; bDe Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;
cUtrecht School of Economics, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands; dFaculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Pension funds’ operating costs impair pension benefits, so it is crucial for pension funds to
operate at the lowest cost possible. In practice, we observe substantial differences in costs per
member for Dutch pension funds, both across and within pension fund size classes. This article
presents new estimates of scale economies of pension funds and is the first that also measures
pension fund X-inefficiency. We use a unique supervisory data set which distinguishes between
administrative and investment costs and apply various approaches and models. Our estimates
show large economies of scale for pension fund administrations, but modest diseconomies of
scale for investment activities. We also found that many pension funds have substantial
X-inefficiencies for both administrative and investment activities. The two kinds of inefficiency
differ across types of pension funds. Therefore, most pension funds should be able to improve










Pension funds have an important role in econo-
mies worldwide in consumption smoothing and
preventing old-age poverty. More precisely, they
prevent their members from under-saving for
retirement and can mitigate the problem of myo-
pic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler 1995, 2013).
Pension fund members can benefit from econo-
mies of scale in investment (Bikker and De Dreu
2009) and (intergenerational) risk sharing (Gollier
2008; Bovenberg and Mehlkopf 2014). However,
operating a pension fund is not without costs, and
excess costs reduce pension capital and thus mem-
bers’ final benefits. Pension fund cost levels appear
to vary widely. A simple calculation shows that a
1% variance can reduce pension capital, i.e. bene-
fits, by 27% (Bikker and De Dreu 2009).
Pension funds’ operating expenses can be broken
down into administrative costs (AC) and investment
costs. AC include keeping files of members’ entitle-
ments, managing the cash flows of contributions and
benefits, performing actuarial calculations, submitting
regular reports to external supervisors, and providing
customer services for planmembers. Investment costs
include developing and implementing of the strategic
asset allocation, selecting andmonitoring internal and
external fund managers, providing regular perfor-
mance evaluations, assessing the risk and return pro-
files of asset classes, and supporting the fund’s
investment committee. Bikker, Steenbeek, and
Torracchi (2012) find that AC vary widely across
countries, pension fund types, pension fund sizes
and the ratio of active fund members to total mem-
bers. Bikker and De Dreu (2009) observe that both
administrative and investment costs differ widely
between pension funds, mainly due to unused econo-
mies of scale, while type of pension fund and type of
pension plan also influence execution costs.
Larger pension funds may benefit from economies
of scale; they can spread their fixed costs (e.g. follow-
ing from IT, reporting, policy development, riskman-
agement) across a larger number of members and
have more negotiating power in investments. They
can also benefit to a larger extent from more internal
investment management (which is three times less
expensive than external management) and receive
more invitations to co-investments (Bikker,
Steenbeek, and Torracchi 2012).
At the same time, larger pension providers may
also suffer from costs that increase more than
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proportionally with their scale: they can have more
severe price impacts with their trades (Bikker,
Spierdijk, and Van Der Sluis 2007), they may have
on average poorer investment ideas (as the better
ideas are chosen first) and may encounter hierarchy
costs as well as budget-maximizing bureaucracies
(Chen et al. 2004; Dyck and Pomorski 2011;
Niskanen 1974). The relationship between size and
costs can be different across specific ranges of size.
For example, bargaining power may require a mini-
mum size, while bureaucracy will only be relevant
for larger size pension funds (Chen et al. 2004). Most
authors find that economies of scale dominate dis-
economies of scale for pension funds of all current
sizes (Bikker andDe Dreu 2009; Dyck and Pomorski
2011). This would imply that there is value to be
gained by increasing the size of pension funds, by
merging for example.
In addition to scale inefficiency, average pen-
sion fund costs can also be higher due to
X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency represents the man-
agerial ability to choose the input set, given input
prices, and the output mix, which minimizes costs,
for all given scales. Where competitive pressure is
insufficient or even absent, there is insufficient
incentive to keep inefficiency down. The
Netherlands, as well as many other countries, has
mandatory participation in employer pension
funds (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011).
This means that pension fund members cannot
leave the pension fund (unless they change
employer), and pension funds face little competi-
tive pressure. Competitive pressure in the pension
domain may therefore fall short as a result of the
institutional setting. In addition, the complexity of
the choices involved (such as asset allocation),
makes most members unable to compare pension
fund performance (Iyengar and Kamenica 2006;
Beshears et al. 2008). Note, however, that employ-
ers are allowed to choose a pension fund, if they
are active in one of the (few) sectors where indus-
try funds are not mandatory. This article is the
first that measures X-inefficiency in the pensions
sector. Further, it indicates to what extent
X-inefficiency and scale inefficiency is affected by
pension fund characteristics such as size and pen-
sion plan type.
The issue of pension fund efficiency is espe-
cially relevant as pension capital represents a
large proportion of household capital. In the
Netherlands, pension capital amounted to over
EUR 1159 billion in 2013, which equals 71% of
total household wealth and 252% of GDP DNB
(2015b). Even small cost inefficiencies would
therefore have large effects in absolute terms.
Our results for the Netherlands have value for
other countries too, as administrative and invest-
ment operations of pension funds are roughly
similar across countries. This has been confirmed
by a cross-country study of Bikker, Steenbeek, and
Torracchi (2012). This statement holds broadly
irrespective of the institutional structure of other
countries’ pension systems, except where the
degree of competition across pension funds devi-
ates, as in, e.g. Chile. Competitive pressure may
lower operational costs but cost of acquisition of
clients may raise costs. However, markets with
competition among pension funds are rare.
In this article, we execute a thorough search for
the optimal functional form of the cost function
underlying our scale economies and X-efficiency
estimates, following Shaffer (1998). The optimal
result is a so-called Quadratic Spline Function
(QSF), which, so far, has not been applied in the
pension funds efficiency literature.
The plan of the article is as follows. Section II
gives a brief description of the Dutch pension
system in order to explain the context of our
research and Section III presents the data.
Section IV discusses the measurement approach
of X-inefficiency and scale inefficiency. We sepa-
rate the activities of pension funds into adminis-
tration (Section V) and investment management
(Section VI). For both activities, we use two dif-
ferent methods that are often applied in the litera-
ture to calculate efficiency. Each method has
advantages and disadvantages that depend on the
nature of the data. On the basis of the empirical
results, we select the method that is most suited
for the specific activity. Next, we investigate for
the parametric approach five different cost func-
tions to find the one that best describes the data.
Using the preferred method, we determine pen-
sion fund X-efficiency and assess economies of
scale. Section VII combines administrative and
investment costs to total costs and analyses how
the combination of the two interact with pension
fund size. Section VIII presents our conclusions.
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II. Brief description of the Dutch pensions
system
The Dutch pensions system is based on the three-
pillar structure. The first pillar comprises of a pay-
as-you-go state pension, which is not means tested
(Bruil et al. 2015). Average retirement income
from the first pillar represents about 54% of total
retirement benefits (Bruil et al. 2015). The second
pillar consists of occupational pension plans, col-
lectively managed by pension funds, insurance
companies, and other types of plan managers.
Second-pillar pensions account for 40% of retire-
ment benefits. The third pillar consists of tax-
deferred savings that can be accrued on an indivi-
dual basis, representing the remaining 6% of
retirement benefits. These individual accounts
are managed by banks, life insurance companies
and retail asset managers.
Three types of pension funds are distinguished:
industry-wide; company and professional group
funds. Industry-wide pension funds cater to employ-
ees from several companies operating within the
same industry. Some industries have mandatory
membership of their industry pension fund, while
others have voluntarily membership (non-manda-
tory). Company pension funds have members deriv-
ing from a single employer, or from several entities in
case of a multinational firm. Professional group pen-
sion funds cater tomembers with specific professions,
such as doctors and dentists. Industry-wide pension
funds have the best opportunities to benefit from
economies of scale, as they can facilitate members
frommany employers. They cover 85% of themarket.
However, these pension funds are more distantly
connected to the companies than company pension
funds, meaning that they can benefit less from direct
support by the sponsoring companies. In addition, a
more fragmented employer base will increase costs.
Professional group pension funds lack both the large
number of members creating economies of scale and
the advantage of a single employer. Actually, their
members are often self-employed and have varying
incomes. These pension funds are expected to operate
at relatively high costs.
In recent years, the Dutch pensions sector saw a
consolidation trend. The number of pension funds
fell to 365 in 2014 from 1060 in 1997 (DNB 2015b),
while the total of life insurers decreased to 40 in 2013
from 90 in 1995. This raises the question as to what
extent consolidation has affected the costs, andmore
specifically the efficiency, of pension funds.
For a full overview of the Dutch pensions sec-
tor, we refer to Bikker (2017). Bikker, Steenbeek,
and Torracchi (2012) compare the institutional
structure of the Dutch pension system with that
of the US, Canada and Australia.
III. Data
This article is based on a unique (non-public) super-
visory data set of all Dutch pension funds between
1992 and 2013. These pension funds all operate in the
second pillar (occupational pension). We ignored
pension funds that report zero or negative costs,
which is probably due to their termination. Pension
funds that have 10 or fewer members were also
omitted from further analysis, as many of them do
not represent collective pension arrangements, but
rather provide a tax vehicle for senior management.
Figure 1 shows the number of pension funds, their
average number of members and their average costs
over time. The increasing average number of mem-
bers per pension fund is due to both the decline in the
number of pension funds and the growth in the
labour force. Given the growing size of pension
funds, we may expect lower costs per member.
However, we observed increasing (inflation-adjusted)
administrative and investment costs over time. This
may indicate increased demands on pension funds in
terms of reporting and regulatory requirements and
the use of more complex asset categories.
Figure 2 shows the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th
percentile of AC per member for 10 size classes
expressed in the number of members. The figure
shows that there are strong economies of scale in
AC per member. The 10% largest pension funds
have AC per member that are about 10 times lower
at the median than they are for the 10% smallest
pension funds in terms of the number of members.
Figure 3 shows the same information for invest-
ment costs with size expressed as total assets of the
pension fund. Contrary to AC, there are no clear
economies of scale visible for investment costs.
According to Bikker (2017), this may be because
larger pension funds tend to invest a higher relative
proportion of assets in complex assets classes. These
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more complex assets tend to have higher costs, and
therefore increase median costs for larger pension
funds, but they also give higher expected returns
(Bikker 2017). Due to the presence of fixed costs, it
is likely that scale economies are present for invest-
ment costs.
Table 1 presents the summary of the relevant
variables for four time periods. These variables are
relevant for the models that we will estimate. The
table clearly shows the consolidation of pension
funds and the increase in both administrative and
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Figure 2. Administrative costs per member in size classes 2002–2013 (2013 prices).
APPLIED ECONOMICS 5167
The proportion of inactive members increased
over time, due to increased labour mobility across
sectors, while the proportion of retirees remained
fairly stable. Total assets per member increase over
time, reflecting pension fund wealth growth. On
top of that, total assets per fund increased even
more, reflecting consolidation. The number of
members with defined contribution plans
increased substantially. This shows that pension
risks are increasingly shifting towards members.
From 2002 onwards, the share of administration
that is outsourced has increased substantially,
partly due to new regulations and partly because
of the splitting of pension funds and pension
delivery organizations. Investment data show that
over the past two decades, the proportion of fixed-
income investments has decreased, mostly in
favour of equity. The proportion of real estate
investments has remained fairly constant and the
share of alternative investments fell between the
first and the second period and has increased since
then. We expect that investment costs increase
with the proportions of equity and real estate, as
investment analyses and risk management in these
areas are more complicated.
Some pension funds report AC that are substan-
tially lower than those of others. Examples are zero
wage or accommodation costs, which are especially
observed for smaller, company-specific, pension
funds. These pension funds are often administered
by the sponsoring company, so that specific costs in
some cases are not or not fully accounted for. This
kind of under-reporting is specifically taken into
account in the remainder of this article. As long as
under-reporting typically has an inverse relation to
size, scale economies and the potential cost benefits
of consolidation are underestimated. Due to stricter
data provision requirements prompted by regula-
tory reporting duties since the introduction of the
financial assessment framework for pension funds
(Financieel toetsingkader FTK) in the Netherlands
in 2006, data from 2007 onwards are more reliable.
IV. Measuring efficiency
Efficiency has many different definitions: produc-
tive, technical, allocation, scale and X-efficiency.
Productive efficiency represents efficiency gained
by combining different inputs in the optimal mix
(minimizing average costs). Technical efficiency is
achieved when average costs are minimized given
the mix of inputs, and allocative efficiency is
achieved when prices of output are equal to the
marginal costs of producing this output.
X-efficiency is the difference between theoretical
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Figure 3. Investment costs as proportion of total assets 2002–2013 (2013 prices).







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Leibenstein 1966). X-inefficiency may exist due to
a lack of competitive pressure, allowing pension
funds to survive while operating at higher costs.
Finally, a pension fund is scale efficient if any
change in size will make it less efficient, as mea-
sured by average costs. These different types of
efficiency can overlap. Firms that have
X-inefficiency or scale inefficiency will also be
technically inefficient and technical efficiency is
required for allocative efficiency, as otherwise
price cannot equal marginal costs (Tirole 1988;
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 1978). Plotting the
number of members and AC for the X-efficient
funds (or total assets and investment costs) gives
the cost frontier. Deviations of observed costs
from the cost frontier represent X-inefficiency, as
the other categories of efficiency are included in
the cost frontier. The frontier itself illustrates the
relation between size and costs and can therefore
be used to assess economies of scale.
Pension funds are not obliged to report all their
activities, but only the costs of these activities,
such as pension administration and investment
outlays. This means that there is no information
about the exact activities undertaken (such as the
amount of hours spent on membership adminis-
tration) and the price of that activity (such as
wages of pension fund employees). Consequently,
productive efficiency cannot be estimated, and
pension fund efficiency is only differentiated
between X-efficiency and economies of scale,
which overlap with technical efficiency.
We investigate and compare two different mea-
surement approaches to efficiency, a parametric
method and a non-parametric method. Non-para-
metric methods use mathematical programming
techniques to calculate the frontier representing
the optimal ratio of inputs to costs. We apply two
different variations of non-parametric efficiency
measurement, the Full Disposal Hull (FDH) refer-
ence technology, and Order α. Parametric meth-
ods start with a predefined cost function which is
fitted to the data. Again we apply two variations,
the linear regression model (LRM), which measures
economies of scale and not X-inefficiency, and
stochastic cost frontier analysis (SCFA). In the
non-parametric method, efficiency is calculated by
comparing the input-to-output ratio of the pension
funds to the best practice pension funds (deter-
mined by selecting the most efficient one for each
possible pair of pension funds). The parametric and
non-parametric methods are discussed in detail in
‘Inputs and output’ and ‘Non-parametric method’
sections. However, before efficiency can be esti-
mated, we must specify the fund’s production pro-
cess. This means that we have to know the relevant
inputs and outputs of pension funds.
Inputs and outputs
Inputs for pension administration and investment
are factors such as labour, premises and equip-
ment, IT, energy, etc. As these inputs, and their
prices, are not reported, we took administrative
and investment costs as indicators for inputs in
the administration and investment processes, in
line with Bikker (2017). Given the amount of out-
puts, pension funds should minimize costs,
thereby optimizing their inputs.
Outputs for pension administration and invest-
ment are factors such as processed changes, mes-
sages sent and processed investment returns. As
these outputs, and their prices, are not reported,
we took the number of members and total assets
as indicators for output respectively in the admin-
istration and investment processes, in line with
Bikker and De Dreu (2009). Administration offers
services to members, and most services are pro-
portional to the number of members. The number
of members was therefore selected as the relevant
measure of output. Investments are usually man-
aged on an aggregate level, irrespective of the
number of members: the number of investment
activities (such as transactions) depends on the
total size of these investments. Therefore, total
assets, discounted for inflation, is taken as the
output measure for investment activities.
Pension fund members in the Netherlands are
not free to choose their own pension fund, so
Dutch pension funds are unable to use retail mar-
keting to influence the number of members or the
value of total assets they manage. This means that
pension funds are input-oriented: they will try to
minimize inputs (i.e. costs), given their output
levels. We follow this input orientation for the
efficiency analysis instead of the output
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orientation, as this only marginally influences effi-
ciency estimates, but makes the interpretation of
the results more intuitive, i.e. allows us to express
efficiency in terms of costs.
Berk and Green (2004) suggest that larger funds
could be run by managers with higher skill, that is
those being more cost efficient. Cost efficiency
could then be correlated with both output (mea-
sured by number of members or total assets) and
costs, as a better management team could suppo-
sedly be able to reduce costs. An omission bias
issue may arise as the ‘pure’ or ‘initial’ size effect is
expanded with the cost efficiency effect, correlated
with size. Both fixed effects estimation and our
stochastic cost approach (which identifies effi-
ciency) help in reducing this omission bias.
Another estimation issue may be potential
endogeneity of the number of members or total
assets, as lower costs may, in principle, attract
more members or raises total assets. Pástor,
Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) provide a detailed
discussion of a related endogeneity issue in their
study of the returns to scale in active mutual fund
management. In the pension sector, this endo-
geneity problem is unlikely as most pension
funds are company funds where the number of
members is determined by the labour needs of the
company. Most industry-wide funds have compul-
sory participation, also excluding any impact of
cost on the number of members.
This may be different for possible endogeneity of
‘total assets’ in the investment cost equation: total
assets increase slightly (in relative terms) where
investment costs are lowest, though than we should
correct for higher investment costs for investments
where expected returns are higher. In an additional
instrumental least squares regression,1 we con-
trolled for endogeneity of total assets using the
instrument ‘number of participants’. The coefficient
estimates were hardly affected.
Non-parametric method
Non-parametric methods use mathematical pro-
gramming techniques to calculate the cost frontier
representing best-practice pension funds. Given
scale, the pension funds with the lowest costs-to-
output ratios constitute the cost frontier (De
Borger and Kerstens 1996). This means that pen-
sion funds are only X-efficient if neither a smaller
nor a larger pension fund have lower costs-to-
output ratios (dependent on the exact non-para-
metric method used). Plotting the X-efficient pen-
sion funds, and drawing connecting lines between
these best practice pension funds, gives the cost
frontier. The deviation with the cost frontier is
X-inefficiency, while the difference between the
cost frontier and the lowest costs-to-output ratio
(irrespective of size) represents scale inefficiency.
An important advantage of non-parametric meth-
ods is that they do not need assumptions about
the functional form of a cost model, like para-
metric approaches do (De Borger and Kerstens
1996). A drawback of non-parametric methods is
that they are extremely sensitive to outliers (e.g.
errors in measured inputs), as these may influence
the cost frontier and thereby the efficiency esti-
mates (Cummins and Weiss 2013; Tauchmann
2012). Large negative errors in input costs (e.g.
under-reporting of costs) would for example shift
the cost frontier upwards, hugely increasing
X-inefficiency (difference between actual perfor-
mance and cost frontier) estimates.
Several non-parametric methods have been sug-
gested in the literature. Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) is most commonly used, and cal-
culates the cost frontier by comparing all observa-
tions with all other observations, the pension fund
in each size category that has best practices
(Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 1978; Färe,
Grosskopf, and Lovell 1985; Seiford and Thrall
1990; Favero and Papi 1995; Coelli 1996; De
Borger and Kerstens 1996). Although DEA is
often used, the necessary computational power of
the model increases exponentially with the num-
ber of observations (Ji and Lee et al. 2010), which
makes the method unfeasible for large datasets.
FDH reference technology is very similar to
DEA. Where DEA uses linear interpolation
between the best-practice pension funds to consti-
tute a minimum cost frontier, FDH builds a step-
wise cost frontier between the best practice
pension funds, which requires less computational
power (De Borger and Kerstens 1996). Due to this
1These estimates are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request.
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stepwise function, X-efficiency estimates can be
slightly higher, as the stepwise cost frontier will
always be lower or equal to the DEA cost frontier
(De Borger and Kerstens 1996). This is illustrated
in Figure 4, where the difference between 10 and
100 represents the difference between DEA and
FDH X-inefficiency. Given the large data set, we
choose to use FDH rather than DEA, in order to
keep our computations manageable.
So far, pension funds have been designated as best-
practice pension funds if neither a smaller nor a larger
pension fund has lower costs-to-output ratios, in
order to allow for variable returns to scale.
However, by repeating the analysis, but only desig-
nating the pension fund with the single lowest costs-
to-output ratio as best practice (not controlling for
size), gives efficiency values with constant returns to
scale.2 Efficiency in this case is lower than (or equal
to) the efficiency estimates in the case of variable
returns to scale, as the cost function will be lower in
the case of constant returns to scale. The difference
between efficiency under variable returns to scale and
constant returns to scale represents economies of
scale, while the remainder represents X-efficiency.
The implicit assumption is that by incorporating
best practices, all pension funds should be able to
achieve an X-efficiency score of 1.3 For a detailed
description of FDH, including an illustration of separ-
ating X-inefficiency and scale inefficiency, we refer to
De Borger and Kerstens (1996).
As noted, a major disadvantage of the non-
parametric methods discussed so far is their sen-
sitivity to outliers. To deal with this problem,
partial frontier approaches have been developed.
Partial frontier approaches, such as Order α
(Aragon, Daouia, and Thomas-Agnan 2005) and
Order−m (Cazals, Florens, and Simar 2002) effi-
ciency, allow for superefficient observations,
which are below the cost frontier. Superefficient
observations can represent random shocks (luck)
or measurement noise, but do not necessarily
represent sustainable best practices. The cost fron-
tier is formed by the selecting the xth percentile
most efficient pension funds, where x depends on
the level of α or m used. The cost frontier is
therefore not formed by the most extreme effi-
ciency values, which makes it less sensitive to out-
liers (Tauchmann 2012). In the case of Order α,
the lowest cost frontier is defined as the α% most
efficient observation, given size. Order α is
equal to FDH if α ¼ 100 (Tauchmann 2012).
Orderm compares pension funds to the best
Figure 4. Example of a cost frontier resulting from the FDH or DEA method.
This figure presents cost frontiers resulting from FDH (solid line) and DEA (dashed line). The X-axis gives output Y and the Y-axis gives costs C. The
dots represent pension funds. Dot 1 gives an inefficient pension fund. FDH efficiency for this dot is value of C for 1ʹ divided by that of 1, while DEA
efficiency is value of C for 1ʺ divided by that of 1. Source: De Borger and Kerstens (1996, p. 150).
2In this case, the frontier will be a linear line from the origin to the observation with lowest costs-to-output ratio and further.
3Efficiency is by definition between (or equal to) 0 and 1, where 0 represents total inefficiency (no output) and 1 total efficiency (lowest possible costs-to-output ratio).
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performance in a random sample of m peers,
based on the sample at hand. As this sample
does not necessarily include all the pension funds
in the sample at hand, including the pension fund
being analysed, X-efficiency can be higher than 1.
This article uses Order α and set α ¼ 95% in
order to reduce the problems caused by the most
extreme outliers. Lower values of α would cause
large proportions of superefficient pension funds.
Parametric method
Parametric methods define a cost function, which
explains costs by explanatory variables, such as
output, input prices and – in our case – other
pension fund characteristics. The model parameters
can be estimated, constituting a median cost fron-
tier, which is comparable to Order α with α ¼
50% in the sense that about half of the observations
is more efficient and the other half less efficient
than the ‘median’ observations. The error terms of
the cost function describe measurement errors of
the variables, specification errors (relating to the
functional form among other things) and omitted
variables. Inefficiency may be one of the omitted
variables. We refer to this model as the LRM.
An alternative approach is to assume that the
error term consists of two components, measure-
ment errors or random shocks (as in the LRM) and
inefficiency. In the SCFA, these two components
are distinguished by attributing a non-negative sta-
tistical distribution for inefficiency besides a normal
distribution for the random shock. This method is
also frequently applied, although not for pension
funds (Hardwick 1997; Bishop and Brand 2003;
Latruffe et al. 2004; Fenn et al. 2008). Pitt and Lee
(1981) define the cost function’s error term ε as
εi;t ¼ ui þ vi;t (1)
The first disturbance, inefficiency ui, is one-sidedly
distributed (u  0), for instance half-normal, with
mean zero. The second disturbance, uncontrolled
random shocks vi;t, is normally distributed, also
with mean zero. Sub-indices i and t refer to pension
fund i and time period t. In explaining X-efficiency
(1 ExpðuiÞ), we transform its estimates using
logistic transformation (Amihud and Goyenko
2013) to control for the non-normality of
X-efficiency. The transformation reads as follows:
X-efficiencytransformed ¼ lnð½1 ExpðuiÞ=ExpðuiÞÞ.
Parametric methods are based on a cost func-
tion. Shaffer (1998) explains how sensitive scale
economy estimates are on the specification of the
relationship between costs and output or size. A
log-linear relationship between cost and pension
fund size would imply a constant cost elasticity
and hence a scale economy estimate that is con-
stant over sizes. The quadratic Translog cost func-
tion (TCF), frequently applied in economic
literature, assumes a U-shaped unit cost, i.e.
costs per member, function. This allows for large
but declining scale economies for pension funds to
below the optimal size, but forces equally strong
diseconomies of scale for pension funds above that
optimal scale. To allow for permanently decreas-
ing costs per member, or for asymmetry around
the optimal scale, more flexible functional forms
are needed. Shaffer (1998) proposes the unrest-
ricted Laurent function (ULF)4 and the hyperbo-
lically adjusted Cobb–Douglas (HACD) function5
also applied to pension funds by Bikker (2017).
Equations 2 and 3 of AC shows the structure of,
respectively the ULF and HACD model:
ULF : lnACðoÞ ¼ αþ β1ðlnoÞ þ β2ðlno lnoÞ2
þ β3=ðlnoÞ þ β4=ðln oÞ2
þ γðpension fund characteristicsÞ
(2)
HACD : lnACðoÞ ¼ αþ β1ðlnoÞ þ β2=o
þ γðpension fund characteristicsÞ
(3)
where ‘o’ refers to output, or size. The various βs
represent the coefficients of the (log-) linear and
non-linear functions of output, and γ is a vector of
coefficients of the pension fund-specific characteris-
tics. The latter include pension fund type, pension
scheme, wealth, type of participants (working, retired
or inactive) and outsourcing. We expect that indus-
try-wide pension fund has lower costs on average, as
4ULF (Equation 2) adds two inverse (log) terms to the TCF, making parabolic costs per member more flexible.
5HACD (Equation 3) is the most simple model, it describes constant economies (or diseconomies) of scale with only one single inverse term of members to
allow for fixed costs.
APPLIED ECONOMICS 5173
they have more standard pension schemes with less
complexity, while the professional funds are expected
to have the highest costs as their participants are
independent entrepreneurs with variable income.
Pension funds with relatively much assets are
expected to have additional cost. We hypothesize
that inactive participants cause less costs while retired
require more costs, e.g. paying benefits. Finally, out-
sourcing should lower costs. Note that the TCF fol-
lows from equation 2 if β3 ¼ β4 ¼ 0.6 This article
applies another, evenmore flexiblemethod, the quad-
ratic spline cost function (QSF), which may also
incorporate possible breaks in the output cost rela-
tionship (Diewert and Wales 1992). QSF add one or
more break points to the quadratic output term of the
TCF. Equation 4 shows a quadratic spline model of
pension fund efficiency with a single quadratic spline.
The location of the breaking point (where output is
x1) is chosen byminimizing AIC
7 of the model over a
grid of possible values of x1.
QSF : lnACðoÞ ¼ αþ β1ðlnoÞ
þ β2½ðlno lnx1Þ2jo  x1 
þ β3½ðlno lnx1Þ2jo < x1 
þ γðpension fund characteristicsÞ
(4)
where β2 is conditional (j j) on the output being
before the break point x1, and β3 conditional on
the output being after the break point x1. In addition
to the variables to capture the relationship with size,
we included as explanatory variable of costs: type of
pension fund, type of pension scheme, ratio of
active, inactive, and retired members to total mem-
bers, assets per member and the outsourcing of
administration (as proportion of AC paid to third
parties). For all panel data linear regression we apply
double-clustered SEs, by pension fund and by year
(Thompson 2011). Bootstrapping is used to estimate
the SEs from the SCFA (Efron and Tibshirani 1986).
Below, we will apply the two variations of the non-
parametric method, and the two variations of the
parametric method, on AC. The estimation results
will show whichmethod is most suitable for describ-
ing pension fund efficiency.
V. Empirical results for AC
This section presents the estimation results of the
various approaches and functional forms for AC,
while Section VI presents the empirical results for
investment costs. We start by selecting the best
approach, either non-parametric or parametric,
and next, for the preferred parametric approach,
investigate what the best functional form is for the
cost model.
Non-parametric results
This section explores the non-parametric methods:
FDH, and an Order α model with α ¼ 95%. The
top of columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 presents
summary data of the X-efficiency estimates for
both non-parametric models and the bottom the
results of a regression analysis explaining these
X-efficiency estimates. The degree of robustness of
these results may help to assess the validity of the
X-efficiency estimates. The regression model
explaining efficiency contains as explanatory vari-
ables linear and non-linear pension fund size mea-
sures as well as pension fund-specific characteristics,
similar as in the cost model. With respect to the
pension fund characteristics, we expect their coeffi-
cient signs to be opposite to those in the cost models,
as high X-efficiency goes with low costs.
The median X-efficiency following from the
FDH model at 0.010 is extremely low. Applying
Order α yields considerably higher X-efficiency
estimates (with a median value of 0.471). The same
is true for the 25th and 75th percentile, with
X-efficiency estimates of 0.005 and 0.029 for
FDH, respectively, and 0.311 and 0.797 for
Order α, respectively. These results suggest that
the data has severe measurement errors, among
other things due to under-reporting of costs,
which particularly for the FDH strongly influences
the X-efficiency estimates. The sensitivity to out-
liers can be clearly observed in Figure 5, which
6To avoid multicollinearity, we also applied a simplified ULF (SULF) model with β4 ¼ 0.
7AIC gives information about the goodness of fit of a function, given the sample. Lower values of AIC represent better model fits. For more information, we
refer to Akaike (1974).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shows the frontiers resulting from FDH and
order α. As Order α is less sensitive to outliers
(see ‘Inputs and output’ section), this approach is
much more suitable to this situation. The levels of
X-inefficiency for FDH and Order α deviate
hugely, but remarkably, the Spearman rank corre-
lation (0.652) shows that both methods yield simi-
lar rankings of pension fund-time observations. In
explaining the inefficiency estimates from both
non-parametric models, we observed similar para-
meter estimates, suggesting that the inefficiencies
from both approaches resemble each other.
We explain the X-efficiency estimates from
pension fund sizes and characteristics. Focusing
on the significant coefficients, Table 2 reveals
that mandatory industry-wide pension funds on
average have the highest X-efficiencies, while,
professional group funds are least X-efficient,
both in line with expectations. Inactive partici-
pants increase efficiency, also in line with expec-
tations. Pension funds that outsource more of
their activities have higher reported costs. As
outsourcing costs is administered more accu-
rately than internal costs, it is likely that this
effect indicates that outsourcing goes hand in
hand with less under-reporting, rather than
showing a true cost effect. As under-reporting
will mostly affect small, company, pension funds
(where wages and rents of premises are some-
times paid directly by the sponsoring company),
true economies of scale may be even larger than
we estimate (Bikker and De Dreu 2009).
Parametric estimation results
The third column of Table 2 presents pension
fund X-efficiency estimated with SCFA. The effi-
ciency is low, on average, at 0.221, with 75% of
funds having an X-efficiency score of lower than
0.283. A comparison of these SCFA estimates
with the X-inefficiencies following from the
nonparametric methods show high values of
Spearman rank correlation (between 0.652 and
0.750), indicating that the rank in X-efficiency is
rather robust for the choice of method. The
results of the parametric models are in line
with those of the non-parametric models in the
sense that pension fund characteristics with the
lowest cost levels now show the highest
efficiencies.
Table 3 presents the results of a first exploration
of the parametric models SCFA and LRM over the
2002–2013 period. Our main interest is in SCFA
which allows for estimation of inefficiency, but we
will also show LRM for comparison. For both var-
iations we specify a TCF, as this is simple, most
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Figure 5. Non-parametric estimates of administrative cost frontiers.
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number of alternative cost functions. The most
general SCFA specification with annual estimates
for inefficiency did not converge. The inefficiency
estimates went to zero so that the error term was
almost fully attributed to the random shocks v.
Therefore, we assume for the SFCA that
X-efficiency is fixed over time, opposed to the ran-
dom shocks that vary each year (Greene 2008). For
both methods, substantial economies of scale exist
for the pension fund with (geometric) mean size (in
terms of the number of members): cost elasticities
(CEs) are 0.74 and 0.81, respectively, indicating that
costs increase substantially less than proportionally
to size. As pension funds never or almost never
change in terms of type, this type variable, and
another variable that is constant over time
(Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution),
cannot be included in the SCFA model, because
they cannot be distinguished from the (also con-
stant) X-inefficiencies.8 Their coefficients only
appear in the LRM estimates (first column of
Table 3). That is the first reason why we (only)
discuss the significant effects of pension fund-spe-
cific characteristics for the LRM. The second reason
is that the constant inefficiency estimates distort the
estimations of the population coefficients, because
the distribution of active, inactive and retired
hardly changes over time.
The mandatory industry-wide funds face the low-
est costs (−29%),9 while professional group funds
face the highest costs (+75%), both in line with
expectations.10 As explained above, outsourcing
acts as an indicator of under-reporting: outsourced
costs are included in costs precisely whereas loans
and office cost are sometimes not included, because
staff and offices were provided directly by the com-
pany, as particularly occurs at smaller pension funds.
Pensioners go with higher cost, while inactive mem-
bers cost less than active ones.
Method
The non-parametric and parametric approaches of
the previous two sections result in distinctively
different cost frontiers, as shown in Figure 6. This
figure shows the cost frontier for each pension fund
size, expressed as the (lowest) costs per member.
Please note that the frontier following from LRM is
the average (and not absolute) cost frontier,
whereas the frontier following from Order α
represents the 95th percentile of the efficiency dis-
tribution. The remaining frontiers (SCFA and
Table 3. Results of parametric models for administrative costs (2002–2013).
(1) (2)
LRM SCFA
Variables Cost elasticity Cost elasticity
Members (in logarithms) 0.736*** (0.024) 0.807*** (0.050)
Members2 (ln, mean dev.) 0.005 (0.005) 0.034*** (0.012)
Industry fund (mandatory) −0.341** (0.0145)
Industry fund (non-mandatory) −0.029 (0.160)
Company fund 0.134 (0.134)
Professional group fund 0.559*** (0.559)
Pension plan: defined contribution −0.131 (0.109)
Outsourcing 0.670*** (0.147) 0.270*** (0.95)
Assets per member (€ million) 0.407 (0.270) 0.062 (0.645)
% Pensioners 0.408*** (0.193) 1.665** (0.296)
% Inactive members −0.554** (0.240) 0.440** (0.182)
Constant −0.132 (0.231) −4.091*** (0.396)
σ2u (inefficiency) 10.501 (0.977)
σ2v (random shocks) 0.234 (0.016)
R2 0.702 0.660
AIC 16,609 11,921
First derivatives (0:736þ 2  0:005  (0:807þ 2  0:034 
ðlnp lnpÞ ðlnp lnpÞ
Cost elasticity at lnp 0.736 0.807
LRM: Double-clustered SEs, SCFA: SEs estimated using Bootstrap, presented in parentheses. p = number of members, number of observations is 6087,
number of pension funds is 799, lnp = ln(2316). P> tj j ¼ *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01.
8Similar as in the case of a fixed effects model.
9Note that  29% follows from the coefficient  0:341 according to:  0:29 ¼ 1 expð0:341Þ.
10In all regression analyses, the pension fund types are compared to a rest group of non-defined types of pension funds.
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FDH) represent fully efficient or best-practice pen-
sion funds: pension fund costs can therefore theo-
retically be on or above, but not below, the cost
frontier. SCFA allows for model errors and hence
lies above the FDH curve. The plotted frontiers of
LRM and SCFA are the estimated effect of the
output (i.e. number of members) variables from
Table 3 on AC per member. For example, the
SCFA cost frontier equals ð0:807  lnparticantsþ
0:034ðlnparticants lnparticantsÞ2Þ=members:The
plotted frontiers of FDH and Order-α are costs per
member and number of members of X-efficient
pension funds (X-efficiency ¼ 1) for pension
funds sorted by their number of members, where
the dots or observations are connected by
interpolation.
As the number of observations drops sharply
for very large pension funds, the non-parametric
methods have different properties at this point.
This results in increasing estimated costs per
members.11 In our sample, the LRM frontier
shows continuously decreasing costs per member
while the other three approaches reveal increases
for the largest pension funds, but not necessary
statistically significant one.
Contrary to the other three methods, LRM does
not allow for the calculation of X-efficiency, and
serves only for comparison. As said, the
X-efficiency calculated for the remaining three
methods show high values of Spearman rank corre-
lation (between 0.652 and 0.750), indicating that the
rank in X-efficiency is relatively robust for the choice
of method, though the median estimated value of
X-inefficiency varies hugely. As FDH andOrder α
are more sensitive to the presence of outliers
(including under-reporting), due to ignoring of the
possibility of measurement and specification errors,
we choose the SCFA approach for the remainder of
this article to measure X-efficiency in the pension
sector. An additional argument for selecting SCFA is
that it can incorporate a number of pension fund
characteristics in explaining costs, so that the
X-inefficiency measurement is not disturbed by
these other costs determinants.
Functional form specification
Scale economy estimates are very sensitive to the
applied functional form of pension size in the cost
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Figure 6. Cost frontier estimates from four model approaches (2002–2013).
11As the number of observations drops, so does the expected value of the minimum cost frontier.
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functions for the preferred SCFA approach: TCF,
ULF, SULF, HACD and QSF, as discussed in ‘Non-
parametric method’ section. Table 4 presents the
estimation results.12 We use AIC to select the func-
tional form that best fits the data. QSF with one
single break point at ln(members) ¼ 5:5, or 245
members, is the optimal model.13 The key results
for the QSF estimation show that vast unused
economies of scale exist for small pension funds
which decrease with pension fund size. Beyond the
break point of ln(members) ¼ 5:5, small, constant
economies of scale remain for larger pension funds.
Three other specifications, (S)ULF and HACD,
confirm that large cost disadvantages exist for
small pension funds, likely because of the presence
of substantial fixed costs. These models have
roughly the same AIC value and do not differ
statistically significantly from the QSF. The model
coefficients and the other statistics hardly differ
across these four functional forms. The popular
TCF, however, is rejected firmly in favour of the
alternative specifications. This has a great impact
on the conclusions drawn from the model, as is
illustrated by Figure 7.
Figure 7 shows the CE over pension fund sizes for
different functional forms (see left axis). The CE of
four functional forms, ULF, SULF, HACD and QSF,
are relatively similar. These functional forms show
large unused economies of scale for small pension
funds (particularly below 1000 members) and small
economies of scale for larger pension funds. The
most important result is that these functions have
CEs below 1, so that no optimal scale exists: scale
economies remain limited to exist without upper
Table 4. SCFA estimates of five functional forms of administrative costs and of X-efficiency (2002–2013).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables TCF ULF SULF HACD QSF
Break point lnx1 ¼ 5:5
Members 0.807*** 1.525** 1.299*** 0.905*** 0.816***
(in logarithms) (0.053) (0.616) (0.218) (0.064) (0.119)
Members2 0.034*** −0.045 −0.027
(ln, mean dev.) (0.013) (0.059) (0.032)







(ln, x1 dev. jp<x1) (0.079)
Members2 0.012
(ln, x1 dev. jp  x1) (0.017)
σ2u (inefficiency) 10.501 10.053 10.055 9.981 10.056
(1.190) (1.601) (1.412) (1.014) (1.495)
σ2v (random shocks) 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234
(0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
R2 0.672 0.674 0.673 0.673 0.654
AIC 11,921 11,889 11,887 11,889 11,881
Wald testa 14*** 65*** 46*** 68*** 57***
First derivatives 0:807þ 1:525 2  1:299 2  0:905 0:816þ
2  0:034  0:045  ðlnp 0:027  ðlnp 45:853=p ð0:340jp<x1Þ
ðlnp lnpÞ lnpÞ  42:992= lnp 23:469  ðlnp lnx1Þ 
ðlnpÞ2 þ 2  =ðlnpÞ2 ð0:012jp  x1Þ
26:557=ðlnpÞ3  ðlnp lnx1Þ
Cost elasticity at lnp 0.807 0.866 0.908 0.885 0.870
X-efficiency:
Average 0.213 0.222 0.221 0.221 0.221
25th percentile 0.103 0.110 0.110 0.111 0.110
Median 0.166 0.177 0.176 0.178 0.176
75th percentile 0.271 0.287 0.285 0.284 0.283
SEs estimated using bootstrap, presented in parentheses. p = number of members. Number of observations is 6087, number of pension funds is 797, lnp = ln(2316).
Break point lnx1;p ¼ 5:5 is equal to 235 members. aWald test for Constant Returns to Scale Hypothesis: coefficient of ln(participants) and ln(total assets) = 1 and
coefficient(s) of non-linear term(s) of ln(members) and ln(total assets) and the interaction term = 0. P> tj j ¼ *<0.10, **<0.05, and ***<0.01.
12The models of Table 4 include pension fund-specific variables, but we do not present them here, as the coefficient estimates are almost identical to the
SCFA estimates presented in Table 3 for each of the five models.
13QSFs with more break points give lower values of AIC.
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size limit. The only exception is the QSF, which
touches the CE ¼ 1 line, but only at the outer
range of the sample and within the confidence inter-
val (not shown in Figure 7), so that no conclusions
can be drawn. TCF, however, gives deviating results,
and is the only functional form that crosses the CE
¼ 1 line firmly and results in substantial diseco-
nomies of scale within the sample size range. This
outcome illustrates how the restrictive parabolic
TCF forms may wrongly dictate the existence of an
optimal scale, and hence diseconomies of scale
beyond that size, which is our key reason for using
more flexible alternative cost functions.
X-efficiency of AC
The average X-efficiency of pension funds for the
QSF specification is 0.221, see bottom panel of
Table 4. Hence, most X-inefficiency estimates are
very large. In interpreting this high level, we should
realize that these estimates incorporate all pension
fund characteristics which differ across pension
funds, but are (mostly) constant over time. We will
therefore take a closer look at X-efficiency and the
effect of these constant characteristics on X-efficiency.
X-inefficiency in this case not only covers man-
agerial inabilities (reflecting less optimal input and
output choices, as in the classic interpretation) but
also heterogeneity across pension funds in terms of
complexity of pension plans, defined benefits ver-
sus defined contribution, service level for members,
etc. Inefficiencies also include institutional obstacles
to achieving the lowest possible cost levels, such as
pension fund types mandated by collective labour
agreements. Finally, any under-reporting of costs
may also affect X-inefficiency estimates.
Our X-efficiency estimates are substantially lower
than those found for most other financial institutes
such as banks (Mester 1996) and mutual funds
(Annaert, Van Den Broeck, and Vander Vennet
2003), where under-reporting is most probably
more limited. And strong links with other institutes,
like company pension funds have with their spon-
sors are absent. Mandatory industry-wide funds are
on average most X-efficient (0.291), followed by
non-mandatory industry funds (0.217), company
funds (0.215) and professional group funds (0.169).
X-efficiency is higher, on average, for pension funds
with defined contribution schemes (0.218) than for
those with defined benefit schemes (0.222).
When we analyse X-efficiency for different size
categories, we find that both the smallest and largest
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Figure 7. Cost elasticity across pension fund size classes for five administrative cost functions (2002–2013).
Cost elasticities below 1 indicate economies of scale. Grey bars give frequency distribution of observed pension fund sizes.
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X-efficiency (0.45 and 0.36 respectively). Pension
funds that are in between (the majority of pension
funds) are least X-efficient (0.18). We do not have
clear explanations for these phenomena. A general
argument may be that medium-sized pension funds
are more heterogeneous. These pension funds more
often vary in the type of fund and the type of pension
plan they offer, which may also lead to larger dis-
crepancies in terms of performance.
VI. Investment costs
Management of investments is a core task of pen-
sion funds, besides administration. These activities
are often outsourced to specialist investment man-
agers, but we will analyse investment costs irrespec-
tively of whether investments are managed
internally or externally. Explaining investment
costs require a different model compared to admin-
istration costs: scale in investments is best
described by total assets under management, as
investment activities are related to the asset portfo-
lio rather than the number of members. In addi-
tion, investment allocation to different asset classes
is expected to influence costs and may therefore be
an important determinant. More complex asset
classes, such as equity, hedge funds, commodities
and real estate, will have higher expected returns,
but they also have higher fund selection and risk
management costs compared to fixed income
investment (Bikker 2017). This means that higher
costs are not necessarily waste, but this makes it
more difficult to estimate an optimal size with
respect to investment costs, as higher costs may
go accompanied by higher returns. Pension fund-
specific characteristics included in our previous
analysis may remain relevant for investment costs
analysis. As some pension funds do not report
investment costs, the number of observations for
investment costs is lower. Key statistics of the rele-
vant variables are summarized in Table 1. We fol-
lowed the strategy from Section V, first
investigating parametric and non-parametric
approaches, and then examining functional forms.
The top of Table 5 presents summary data of
X-efficiency estimates for investments and the
bottom results of a regression analysis explaining
these efficiency estimates. FDH X-efficiency esti-
mates are at 0.057 very low on average, comparable
to the AC results. Order α (with α ¼ 95) results in
higher X-efficiency scores (0.446) and that also holds
for SCFA (0.523). Note that average X-efficiency
particularly for SCFA is substantially higher than
that for AC (0.221). X-efficiency estimates are rela-
tively robust for the selected method, with Spearman
rank correlations ranging between 54% and 67%.
Explaining X-efficiency with a regression
model, using the logistic transformation (lower
panel of Table 5) reveals that efficiency tends to
decline with size. Efficiency is much higher for
industry-wide and company pension funds, com-
pared to professional group funds, in line with
expectations (lower costs, more efficiency). For
SCFA efficiency estimates, we find that efficiency
is higher for retired and inactive participants, as
expected. X-efficiency is lower for investments in
equity and real estates, which is plausible as costs
of investment analyses are higher for those invest-
ment categories.
As for AC, we select SCFA as our preferred
method for estimating investment costs. It is
least sensitive to outliers (e.g. due to under-report-
ing) and can incorporate pension fund character-
istics, in particular the asset allocation variables
into the cost function, which are therefore not
included in the inefficiency term.
Table 6 presents results for the parametric models
of investment costs. We include LRM for comparison
and because that is the only model which allows the
estimation of pension fund types and pension plans
effects.14 The estimation results for LRM and SCFA
are quite similar, with an approximately equal CE at
the mean (0.988 and 0.952, respectively), and fairly
equal optimal sizes (€223 and €220 million, respec-
tively). The LRM dummy coefficient of pension fund
types indicate that industry-wide and company pen-
sion funds have much lower costs than professional
group pension funds, similarly to administration
costs and also in line with the X-efficiency estimates
explanations in Table 5. We conclude that industry-
wide and company pension funds appear to be more
efficient. Equity and real estate go with higher
14Note that dummies cannot be identified in SCFA with constant X-efficiency terms. Furthermore, these constant terms distort the estimations of the
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investment cost, as said due to more elaborate invest-
ment analyses for these types of investments.
Functional form of investment costs
As in the AC analysis in ‘Functional form spe-
cification’, we applied TCF, (S)ULF, HACD and
QSF to investment costs. The results are pre-
sented in Table 7, where the number of break
points and their locations are selected by mini-
mizing AIC.15 Figure 8 shows the CEs over time
that follow from the five cost functions. Both
the average X-efficiency that follows from the
five functional forms of investment and the
implied CEs differ only slightly across the spe-
cifications. The results are therefore relatively
robust for the choice of functional form of
investment costs.
Using AIC we found that QSF, with a single
break point at total assets of €800 million, best
describes investment costs. Column 5 in Table 7
presents the QSF estimation results. This func-
tional form suggests that the CE of investment
costs increases up to the break point, and
decreases after this point (the coefficient after the
break point is not significantly different from
zero). The majority of pension funds (55.7%)
have investment activities which operate under
implied decreasing returns to scale (CE > 1),
which is markedly different from administrative
activities.
The CE at the mean level of total assets is 1.002,
and higher for larger portfolio’s due to the quadratic
effect. This means that increases in total assets will
give, although not statistically significant, a more than
proportional increase in investment costs. However,
larger pension funds may invest in more complex
assets, and may invest more actively. This has higher
costs, but also yields higher (expected) returns.
Higher costs due to more complex investments by
larger pension funds therefore does not necessarily
imply that larger funds have lower efficiency.
As the CE for investment costs is markedly
different from that of AC, pension funds may
have economies of scale in AC, while facing
diseconomies of scale in investment costs.
Section VII analyses total costs, using both the
number of members and total assets as output
indicators to obtain an overall view on the
optimal scale.
Table 6. Results of parametric models for investment costs (2002–2013).
(1) (2)
Variables LRM SCFA
Total assets (€1000, in logarithms) 0.988*** (0.021) 0.952*** (0.038)
Total assets2 (in ln, mean dev.) 0.011** (0.004) 0.045*** (0.010)
Industry fund (mandatory) −0.438*** (0.159)
Industry fund (non-mandatory) −0.322* (0.168)
Company fund −0.341** (0.132)
Professional group fund 0.298* (0.170)
Pension plan: defined contribution 0.111 (0.089)
Assets per member (€ million) −0.066 (0.153) −0.202 (0.151)
% Pensioners 0.163 (0.230) 0.178 (0.404)
% Inactive members 0.606*** (0.193) 0.565** (0.262)
Investments:
Equity 0.421* (0.250) −0.147 (0.213)
Real estate 1.577** (0.612) 0.730 (0.539)
Fixed income 0.209 (0.191) 0.264** (0.166)
Constant −6.916*** (0.331) −8.361*** (0.341)
σ2u (inefficiency) 3.042 (0.494)
σ2v (random shocks) 0.661 (0.043)
R2 0.746 0.738
First derivatives 0:988þ 2  0:011  0:952þ 2  0:045 
ðlnta lntaÞ ðlnta lntaÞ
Cost elasticity at lnta 0.988 0.952
LRM: Double-clustered SEs, SCFA: SEs estimated using Bootstrap, presented in parentheses. ta = value of total assets. Number of observations is 4498,
number of pension funds is 646, ln ta = ln(1291 million).
P> tj j ¼ *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01.
15The models also include pension fund-specific characteristics, not shown in Table 7, as the respective coefficient estimates are almost identical to those in
Table 5 for SCFA.
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VII. Total costs
The previous two sections show that administra-
tive and investment costs have different optimal
sizes. To find the overall results, we combined
both cost categories and analysed total operational
costs. As both output measures, the number of
members and total assets, are relevant in explain-
ing total costs, we included them in the total cost
function. In line with the previous findings, we
applied a QSF SCFA for total costs, using the
optimal break points for the number of members
(245 members; lnx1;p) and total assets (€800 mil-
lion; lnx1;ta) obtained in the previous sections. In
order to allow for possible output interaction
effects, we included an additional variable:
Interaction members x total assets
¼ ðlnp lnx1;pÞ  ðlnta lnx1;taÞ (5)
Table 8 shows the resulting coefficients for the
QSF of total costs. The coefficients for total costs
are all of similar sign and magnitude as found
before. Average total costs initially rise substan-
tially with increases in the number of members
and/or total assets and smooth out with increases
beyond both breaking points. The negative coef-
ficient of the interaction effect shows that costs
increase relatively stronger if one of the two out-
put measures, number of members or total assets,
outpaces the other. The CE at the average num-
ber of members (2.136) and for the average total
assets (€129 million) is 0.990, which indicates
approximate constant returns to scale (CE not
significantly different from 1).
Figure 9 shows a 3D graph of CE dependent
on the number of members (Z-axis) and total
assets (X-axis). CE depends most strongly on
Table 7. Estimates of five functional forms of investment costs and of X-efficiency (2002–2013).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables TCF ULF SULF HACD QSF
Break point lnx1 ¼ 20:5
Total assets 0.952*** 5.466*** 1.513*** 1.057*** 1.305***
(€1000, in logarithms) (0.038) (1.809) (0.393) (0.054) (0.078)
Total assets2 0.045*** −0.151* 0.008
(in ln, mean dev.) (0.010) (0.078) (0.032)
Total assets2 0.083***
(ln, x1 dev. j<x1) (0.015)
Total assets2 −0.014
(ln, x1 dev. j>x1) (0.026)
1/(ln total assets) 1088.582** 70.768
(451.384) (47.391)




σ2u (inefficiency) 3.042 2.995 2.996 2.981 2.966
(0.494) (0.454) (0.448) (0.464) (0.534)
σ2v (random shocks) 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.670 0.660
(0.043) (0.051) (0.042) (0.040) (0.044)
R2 0.733 0.731 0.733 0.734 0.730
AIC 12,340 12,328 12,336 12,380 12,325
Wald testa 22*** 62*** 52*** 1.63 34***
First derivatives 0:952þ 2  5:466 2  1:513þ 2  1:057 1:305þ ½2 
0:045 0:151 0:008 1688:651=ta 0:083
ðln ta ln taÞ ðlnta ln taÞ ðlnta ln taÞ ðln ta x1Þj
 1; 088:582=  70:768= ta  x1  ½2 
ðln taÞ2 þ 2  ðlntaÞ2 0:014
2; 779:579= ðln ta x1Þj
ðlntaÞ3 ta>x1
Cost elasticity at mean 0.952 1.017 1.004 1.057 1.002
X-efficiency:
Average 0.516 0.522 0.520 0.520 0.523
25th percentile 0.318 0.320 0.320 0.329 0.322
Median 0.495 0.510 0.498 0.491 0.511
75th percentile 0.739 0.741 0.742 0.737 0.738
SEs estimated using Bootstrap, presented in parentheses, ta = value of total assets. Number of observations is 4498, number of pension funds is 646, lnta =
ln(€1291 million). Break point lnx1 ¼ 20:5 is at €800 million total assets. aWald test for Constant Returns to Scale Hypothesis: coefficient of ln(total
assets) = 1 and coefficient(s) of non-linear term(s) of ln(total assets) = 0.
P> tj j ¼ *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01.
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the number of members and shows strong econo-
mies of scale for pension funds with a number of
members or total assets up to the breaking
points. After the breaking points, CE is close to
1, indicating that there are few benefits to further
increases in size.
The analysis of total costs shows that small pension
funds (below the breaking points) can benefit from
reduced average costs by increasing the number of
members and/or total assets, preferably both.
Although the economies of scale smooth out after









































Assets under management (€ million)
% Pension funds (right axis) TCF ULF SULF HACD QSF (left axis)
Figure 8. Cost elasticity for five investment cost functions (2002–2013).
Table 8. SCFA estimates of the QSF model of total operational costs (2002–2013).
Variables
Members (in logarithms) 0.134 (0.167)
Members2 (ln, x1;p dev. j  x1;p) 0.189* (0.097)
Members2 (ln, x1;p dev. j>x1;p) 0.020 (0.019)
Total assets (€1000, ln) 1.066*** (0.145)
Total assets2 (ln, x1;ta dev. j  x1;ta) 0.075*** (0.020)
Total assets2 (ln, x1;ta dev. j>x1;ta) 0.009 (0.028)
Interaction members × total assets (ln, x1 dev.) −0.062** (0.026)
σ2u (inefficiency) 1.955*** (0.700)
σ2v (random shocks) 0.132*** (0.013)
R2 0.769
Wald testa 1055***
First derivative 1:200þ 2  0:189  ðlnp lnx1;pjp  x1;pÞ þ
2  0:020  ðlnp lnx1;pjp>x1;pÞ þ
2  0:075  ðln ta lnx1;tajta  x1;taÞ þ
2  0:009  ðlnta lnx1;tajta>x1;taÞ 
0:062  ðlnp lnx1;pÞ  0:062 
ðln ta lnx1;taÞ
Cost elasticity at lnp and ln ta 0.990
SEs estimated using Bootstrap presented in parentheses, p = number of members, ta = value of total assets. Number of observations is 4498, number of
pension funds is 646, lnp = ln(2316), lnta = ln(€1291 million). Break points lnx1;p ¼ 5:5 and lnx1;ta ¼ 20:5 are equal to 235 members and €800 million total
assets respectively.
aWald test for Constant Returns to Scale Hypothesis: sum of coefficients of ln(partipants) and ln(total assets) = 1 and coefficient(s) of non-linear term(s) of ln
(members) and ln(total assets) and the interaction term = 0.
P> tj j ¼ *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01.
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diseconomies of scale for any size observed in our
sample. Although there is no optimal size, benefits of
increasing pension fund size, either in the number of
members or in the value of total assets, are absent
beyond the breaking points (235 members and €800
million total assets).
Table 9 presents X-efficiency estimates for total
operational costs. Average X-efficiency is at 0.785
much higher than for total operational costs than
for its two components (0.221 for AC and 0.523 for
investment costs).
VIII. Summary and conclusion
Pension benefits not only depend on pension fund
investment returns, but also on the costs incurred
during the accumulation of pension capital. Higher
costs reduce pension capital, and therefore depress
final benefits. Substantial differences are found in
per capita pension fund costs. We expect that these
cannot be fully attributed to differences in quality of
the services and thus may represent differences in
efficiency of running the pension funds. We ana-
lysed the efficiency of the administrative and invest-
ment activities of Dutch pension funds by
comparing the cost-output ratio of pension funds
with best practice pension funds. The number of
members and value of total assets were chosen as
proxies for the output of the administration and
investment activities, respectively.
We measured X-efficiency by means of both a
parametric method and a non-parametric method.
SCFA was selected as preferred research method for
both administrative and investment activities as it
can explicitly incorporate random noise, such as
measurement error, and allows for incorporation
of pension fund characteristics, such as type of
member and outsourcing. Five functional cost mod-
els were applied to investigate the complex relation
between size and output. For both activities the
estimation results are relatively robust across func-
tional forms; a QSF with a single break point best
describes administrative and investment costs.
For AC, we found a CE of below 1 for the vast
majority of pension fund sizes, indicating economies
of scale on AC. Only 11 pension funds (118 observa-
tions) are above the implied optimal size of 52,650


























Figure 9. 3D graph of cost elasticity for total costs.
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efficient and professional group funds are the least
efficient. Higher levels of outsourcing correlate with
higher costs. Outsourcingmay indicate under-report-
ing, so that the coefficient of outsourcing partly acts as
a negative proxy to under-reporting. Note that under-
reporting means that economies of scale are even
larger than observed, leaving the recommendation
of consolidation unchanged.
For investments costs, we found substantially
higher CEs. This implies that the majority of pen-
sion funds (pension funds with total assets below
€127 million) have disecononomies of scale for
investment activities. However, as larger pension
funds may invest in more complex asset classes
(which have higher costs, but also higher expected
returns), this may not necessarily point to waste.
Industry-wide funds have the lowest investment
costs, and professional group funds the highest,
similarly as for AC.
As administrative and investment costs have
different economies of scale estimates we also
analysed their sum: total operational costs. We
found a CE close to 1 for average sized pension
funds (in terms of members and total assets).
Smaller funds have unused economies of scale,
pension funds beyond the breaking points (235
members and €800 million total assets) fluctuate
around constant returns to scale.
From the perspective of efficiency, it seems
desirable for smaller pension funds to consolidate,
but for medium-sized and larger pension funds,
no scale-economy benefits can be achieved.
Within each size class, large differences in X-effi-
ciency remain, however.
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